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PROVIDING HOPE: DEVELOPING A VIABLE REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR PROVIDING TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS
WITH ADEQUATE ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS
James P. Sikora*
“Don’t leave a stone unturned. It’s always something, to know you’ve done the most you
could. But, don’t leave off hoping, or it’s of no use doing anything. Hope, hope, to the
last!”1
“If I die . . . I want my children to know I did everything I could.”  This2
is a common feeling among terminally ill individuals facing death. This desire
to exhaust every option often causes people to fight to receive potentially
toxic and dangerous treatments that are still in the investigational phase if the
treatment provides even a glimmer of hope for survival or improvement in
condition.  Investigational treatments, however, expose patients to myriad3
risks that can be difficult to predict.  Jolee Mohr’s mysterious death provides4
a sad illustration of the dangers of investigational drugs.  Mrs. Mohr’s5
physician recruited her for a clinical trial to test the safety of an
investigational arthritis treatment.  After she received the investigational6
treatment, Mrs. Mohr experienced intractable vomiting and increased body
temperature.  She subsequently slipped into unconsciousness, and her family7
made the decision to remove life support after doctors confirmed that she had
no hope of recovery.8
Limiting access to investigational drugs may help prevent tragedies
similar to Mrs. Mohr’s. These limitations, however, reduce an individual’s
access to treatments that may provide the only hope for the terminally ill. A
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Wall Street Journal editorial revealed the effects of limits on access to
investigational drugs when it published its plea to address Kianna Karnes’s
attempt to access two investigational cancer therapies. While the entire nation
focused on the outcome of the Terri Schiavo controversy, Kianna Karnes was
nearing the end of her battle against kidney cancer that had spread throughout
her body.  The circumstances surrounding the battle for the lives of these two9
women, however, differed significantly. Kianna Karnes and her treating
physicians believed that access to the right drugs would help prevent her
death.  Mrs. Karnes had sought, but was denied, access to two investigational10
drugs that had the potential to help her in her battle against cancer. Both drugs
had shown promise in FDA trials for many years.  Mrs. Karnes, however, was11
unable to access the drugs through any of the available channels.
The sequence of events following the Wall Street Journal’s editorial is
tragic. Mrs. Karnes died the day after publication of the editorial at the age of
forty-four, leaving behind four children.  To add to this tragedy, the12
manufacturers of the two investigational drugs contacted Mrs. Karnes’s
physician, and the FDA contacted her family immediately following the
publication of the Journal’s editorial.  The Journal summarized the13
hopelessness of the situation by noting, “isn’t it a national scandal that cancer
sufferers should have to be written about in the Wall Street Journal to be
offered legal access to emerging therapies once they’ve run out of other
options?”14
The phenomenon of individuals seeking to access investigational drugs
is not new. Patients hoping to exhaust every possible treatment before
succumbing to death have sought access for several decades. The first
criticisms of a “drug lag” arose shortly after the FDA began testing for
efficacy in 1962.  A 1973 study examined the effects of the new efficacy15
requirements and determined that compliance with the FDA’s clinical trial
process discouraged research and prevented the introduction of some effective
drugs into the market.  The debate continued when patient-advocates thrust16
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themselves into the regulatory process during the AIDS crisis of the 1980s.17
Critics of the FDA’s policies during this crisis attacked the FDA’s approval
system as a whole, the methods used to test investigational drugs, and the
inability of large populations of AIDS patients to access investigational
drugs.  Patient-advocates argued that the absence of conventional treatments18
allowed individual autonomy to trump the government’s interest in safety.19
The FDA responded to these criticisms by expanding access to certain
investigational drugs that have completed part of the trial process.  The20
debate between the competing interests of individual autonomy and safety is
a critical component of the ongoing controversy surrounding access to
investigational drugs.
In Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach,  the United States Court of21
Appeals for the District of Columbia intensified the pressure on the FDA to
increase access to investigational drugs by recognizing the right of a
terminally ill patient to access certain investigational drugs.  The D.C. Circuit22
held that “where there are no alternative government-approved treatment
options, a terminally ill, mentally competent adult patient’s informed access
to potentially life-saving investigational new drugs determined by the FDA
after Phase I trials to be sufficiently safe for expanded human trials warrants
protection under the Due Process Clause.”  The court applied Washington v.23
Glucksberg  to conclude that regulation of investigational drugs is the24
exception and not the rule in the United States because regulation for safety
began in 1906 and regulation for efficacy began in 1962.  The court25
concluded that the rights to self preservation and control over one’s body have
ancient roots in the common law.  Furthermore, the court concluded that the26
FDA failed to demonstrate that “government control of access to potentially
life-saving medication ‘is now firmly ingrained in our understanding of the
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appropriate role of government,’ so as to overturn the long-standing tradition
of the right of self-preservation.”  27
After rehearing the case en banc, the District of Columbia Circuit held
that terminally ill adult patients had no fundamental right to access
investigational drugs.  The en banc majority traced drug regulation back to28
Colonial Virginia and even back to 15th century England to conclude that
there is a history of evolving government regulation of drugs in response to
changing science and technology.  Most importantly, the majority recognized29
the interests of terminally ill individuals and emphasized that the legislative
and regulatory branches of government are best equipped to find the
appropriate balance between individual liberty and community safety.30
This note will explore the recent arguments presented by patient-
advocates in support of a constitutionally protected liberty interest to access
investigational drugs. Part I will explore the development of regulations
governing the distribution of investigational drugs and demonstrate that
limited access to investigational drugs should be permitted for certain
individuals. Part II will explore potential constitutional foundations for a right
of terminally ill patients to access certain investigational drugs and will
demonstrate that current constitutional jurisprudence does not provide a strong
framework for a right to access these drugs. Part III will examine potential
statutory interpretations that would grant a right to access investigational
drugs and the FDA’s proposed method for increasing access. Part IV will
point out the dangers of recognizing a constitutional right to access
investigational drugs, show that such a right would likely become illusory, and
conclude that increased access should occur through the legislative and
regulatory process.
I. HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS
Prior to the early 20th century, any regulation of drugs occurred at the
state level and was inconsistent between states.  As a result, adulteration and31
misbranding of drugs was common throughout the 19th century.  The few32
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instances of federal regulation of drugs that did occur prior to the 20th century
focused on the importation of drugs.  Congress’s first attempt to correct the33
misbranding and adulteration problems occurred in 1906 with the passage of
the Pure Food and Drug Act (“1906 Act”).  The 1906 Act prohibited the sale34
of misbranded or adulterated foods or drugs in interstate commerce.35
Furthermore, the statute required manufacturers to evaluate the strength,
quality, and purity of drugs and to provide accurate drug content labels.  The36
statute focused on providing accurate labels to consumers instead of pre-
market approval. The United States Pharmacopoeia and the National
Formulary defined strength, quality, and purity. Any drugs not in compliance
with these standards could not be sold unless the deviations from these
standards were plainly stated on the label.  Enforcement of the 1906 Act37
focused on foods, which many believed posed a greater public health threat
than drugs.  The United States Supreme Court rendered the 1906 Act38
ineffective when it ruled that “misbranding” as used in the statute included
only statements of the “identity of the article” and not any therapeutic
claims.  Therefore, the 1906 Act continued to permit access to any new drug39
for medicinal use because manufacturers were not restricted in the therapeutic
claims that they could make.40
Pressure continued to increase on Congress to remedy the ineffectiveness
of the 1906 Act in the years following its enactment. The final push occurred
in the 1930s with the introduction of Elixir Sulfanilamide, a drug targeted at
pediatric patients. Elixir Sulfanilamide contained a highly toxic chemical
similar to antifreeze.  The distribution of Elixir Sulfanilamide caused more41
than one hundred deaths, including the deaths of a large number of children.42
In 1938, Congress responded to the disaster by passing the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).  The most significant change in the regulatory43
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scheme was that the FDCA required extensive testing prior to granting
governmental approval for new drugs.  The FDCA required the drug44
manufacturer to provide proof that a drug was safe before it was distributed
in interstate commerce.45
Drug regulation remained largely unchanged until 1962 when Congress
responded to the Thalidomide tragedy by mandating, in the Kefauver-Harris
Amendments to the FDCA, that the FDA review drugs for efficacy as well as
safety prior to their distribution in interstate commerce.  The Amendments46
also provided the FDA with stricter control over drug trials.  The47
Thalidomide disaster is considered one of the greatest tragedies in the history
of medicine. Many experts still believe, however, that it was unavoidable.48
Thalidomide was widely used and praised as the most effective and safe
sedative available.  The drug was also widely used to treat morning sickness49
in pregnancy, but was found to cause malformations in unborn children in
1962.  The dramatic effects of Thalidomide on unborn babies created a50
massive groundswell of support for increased regulation of prescription drugs
in the United States.  The 1962 Amendments are responsible for the current51
review process in effect today.
The FDA approval process is divided into three phases. Phase I trials
enroll 10 to 100 individuals who are typically healthy. The average length of
a Phase I trial is 1.5 years and costs approximately $10 million. The goal of
this phase of testing is to establish a maximum safe dose for the drug.  Phase52
II trials enroll from 50 to 500 patients who suffer from the disease targeted by
the drug. Researchers focus on the characteristics of patients who will be
enrolled in the final phase of testing and make preliminary estimates of the
effective doses of the drug and the duration of treatment. Phase II trials are
approximately two years in length and cost $20 million on average.  Phase III53
is the final stage of testing during which researchers seek to determine
whether the treatment is effective and to discover side effects of the drug.
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Phase III trials typically enroll from 300 to 300,000 patients depending on the
drug being studied, last approximately three to four years, and cost $45
million.  The testing process typically requires more than a decade to54
complete and a majority of drugs fail to complete the three-stage process.55
The FDA currently provides several methods for limited access to
investigational drugs. An investigational drug is a drug that has not yet been
approved for distribution in interstate commerce under the FDCA. In 1987, the
FDA adopted new regulations regarding the treatment use of investigational
drugs (“Treatment IND”).  Under these regulations, a drug manufacturer or56
practicing physician may submit a treatment protocol  to the FDA for57
approval to distribute an investigational drug prior to completion of testing.58
Application for Treatment IND occurs when an investigational drug
demonstrates potential to aid patients with serious and life-threatening
diseases.  However, drugs approved for Treatment IND must demonstrate59
some promise of safety and efficacy  and must be in Phase II trials.  Most60 61
Treatment INDs are approved while in Phase III.  Terminally ill patients62
seeking increased access argue that the Treatment IND method is not
comprehensive enough because access to investigational drugs that have
shown promise in early trials, such as investigational drugs that have
completed Phase I testing or early Phase II testing, is still restricted.  The63
second method for access to investigational drugs is the compassionate use
investigational new drug (“Compassionate Use”) or single-patient
investigational new drug (“Single-Patient IND”).  Three requirements must64
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be met for a terminally ill patient to obtain access under Compassionate Use:
(1) the drug manufacturer must be willing to provide the investigational drug
to the patient; (2) the patient must give informed consent; and (3) the treating
physician must assume responsibility for treating the patient and agree to
compile data about the effects of the investigational drug.65
The FDA should be commended for its efforts to continually increase
access to investigational drugs. These efforts, however, need to continue so
that the FDA can provide terminally ill patients with more options in the safest
manner possible. The current structure for obtaining access outside of the
clinical trial process must be reviewed and refined to become more responsive
to, and reduce the burden imposed on, terminally ill patients. Stories of
terminally ill patients dying, such as Kianna Karnes, are far too common. The
current exclusive focus on safety must be balanced against the terminally ill
individual’s right to access investigational drugs. The FDA should strive to
find the appropriate balance between these two competing interests so that
people are protected from dangerous drugs, but also have the ability to access
appropriate investigational drugs.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A RIGHT TO ACCESS
INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.”  The United States Supreme Court66
has held that the Due Process Clause “guarantees more than fair process, and
the ‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint.”67
This liberty protects an individual’s freedom from unwarranted government
intrusion into the home, but the liberty is not limited thereto.  The Court has68
explained that “[f]reedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct.”  Examples of rights that the Court has defined as69
protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause are the right to marry,
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to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to
marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion.70
In Washington v. Glucksberg,  the Supreme Court set forth a two-part71
test to determine whether an asserted right is a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.  First, the Court72
stated that the Due Process Clause “protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are . . . ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’
and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”  Second, the Court required that73
the claim provide a “‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest.”  If the asserted interest passes the two-part test, any infringement74
by the State must pass strict scrutiny by being narrowly tailored and serving
a compelling state interest.75
In Glucksberg, four terminally ill patients and four physicians argued that
a mentally competent, terminally ill adult has a liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to commit physician-
assisted suicide.  The Court rejected this argument and held that the right to76
physician-assisted suicide is not a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause because history demonstrates an almost universal and continuous
rejection of this asserted liberty interest.  The Court compared the asserted77
right of physician-assisted suicide with the right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, and while concluding that these two decisions are both “personal
and profound,” pointed to the fact that the two decisions do not enjoy similar
legal protection.  The Court explained that the implied right to refuse78
unwanted medical treatment “was not simply deduced from abstract concepts
of personal autonomy,” but rather was grounded in the common-law right of
protection from unwanted interferences with bodily integrity—i.e., the
protection accorded by battery law.  The Court concluded that its79
“assumption was entirely consistent with this Nation’s history and
200 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:191
80. Id.
81. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
82. Id. at 266. Persistent vegetative state is a condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes
but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Cruzan’s parents were her co-guardians at this point. See id. at 268.
86. Id. at 267-68.
87. Id. at 268.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 280.
91. Id. at 280-81.
constitutional traditions.”  This comparison highlights the emphasis the Court80
placed on history related to the asserted interest when determining whether the
asserted right was a protected liberty interest.
The Supreme Court addressed a competent individual’s right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health.81
Nancy Cruzan suffered major injuries in a car accident, and she subsequently
slipped into a coma.  Cruzan remained in a coma for three weeks, after which82
time doctors implanted in her a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube.83
Cruzan’s husband consented to the implementation of the tubes.  After all84
rehabilitative efforts failed and it became apparent that Cruzan had almost no
chance of leaving the persistent vegetative state, Cruzan’s parents  requested85
that hospital employees terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration
processes that kept Cruzan alive.  The hospital refused to terminate the86
artificial processes without court approval, and Cruzan’s parents sought and
received approval from a Missouri state trial court.87
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and held that the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment is not embodied in the right of privacy in either
the Missouri Constitution or the United States Constitution.  The Missouri88
court did recognize the right to refuse medical treatment under the common
law doctrine of informed consent, but held that a state policy in favor of
preserving life prevented Cruzan’s parents from exercising choice in this
situation.  Missouri’s requirement of “clear and convincing” evidence of the89
incompetent person’s intent to withdraw from treatment embodied the state’s
policy in favor of the preservation of life.90
The Supreme Court of the United States held that Missouri could require
production of “clear and convincing” evidence of the incompetent individual’s
desire to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.  The Court concluded that91
a state has an interest in safeguarding the personal element of the choice to
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refuse medical treatment because of the “obvious and overwhelming finality”
of the decision.  The heightened evidentiary standard helps protect the92
incompetent individual from abuse.  To arrive at this conclusion, the Court93
assumed that a competent person has a protected liberty interest that permits
refusal of unwanted medical treatment.94
The Court inferred the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment from
its prior decisions and the common law doctrines of battery and informed
consent.  At common law, the harmful or offensive touching of one person95
by another with the intent to cause such contact is battery.  The principles of96
bodily integrity and individual autonomy also underlie the doctrine of
informed consent.  Justice Cardozo explained that an individual has “a right97
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient’s consent [ ] commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages.”  In light of the theories of battery and98
informed consent, the Court concluded that “the logical corollary of the
doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally possesses the right
not to consent . . . to refuse treatment.”  The Court, however, has never99
explicitly held that the right of a competent adult to refuse unwanted medical
treatment rises to the level of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause.100
Proponents of a right to access investigational drugs often cite a
competent individual’s right to refuse unwanted medical treatment in support
of a right to access investigational drugs. The argument can be summarized as
follows: “If there is a protected liberty interest in self-determination that
includes a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment . . . then the same liberty
interest must include the complementary right of access to potentially life-
sustaining medication. . . .”  The focus of this analogy is the removal of101
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government from the individual’s decision making process. Access proponents
conclude that any government interference in the decision of whether or not
to take an investigational drug is a violation of an individual’s right to self-
determination.102
The argument that the right to access investigational drugs must be
complementary to the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment seems
to misperceive the basis for the right to refuse medical treatment. As
previously mentioned, the right to refuse medical treatment is derived from the
common law doctrines of battery and informed consent.  These doctrines103
focus on the individual’s interest in bodily integrity and freedom from harmful
or offensive touching. Therefore, the logical conclusion from these doctrines
is that a person cannot be forced to undergo medical treatment.  There is no104
such logical conclusion from the common law doctrine of the right to access
investigational drugs.
In Abigail Alliance, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia derived the right to access investigational drugs from the common
law doctrines of necessity and self-defense.  The court concluded that these105
“ancient principles” of common law demonstrate a right of self-preservation
that supports the right to access investigational drugs as an exercise of the
right to self-preservation.  The doctrine of necessity arises when a person106
injures “an innocent person in order to avoid danger from another source.”107
Courts, however, have only applied the doctrine in a small number of cases
and almost exclusively to situations where real or personal property is
damaged.  Furthermore, in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’108
Cooperative,  the Supreme Court rejected a common law defense of109
necessity to the Controlled Substances Act and held that “the defense cannot
succeed when the legislature has made a determination of values.”  The110
District of Columbia Circuit’s en banc majority argued that Congress already
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eliminated the necessity defense in the FDCA by prohibiting “general access
to experimental drugs. . . .”111
The doctrine of self-defense is the privilege to use “all reasonable force
to prevent any threatened harmful or offensive bodily contact, or any
confinement . . . .”  Both the necessity and self-defense doctrines focus on112
the individual’s freedom from unwanted touching and the avoidance of harm.
Although these common law doctrines do provide some support that a person
should have the ability to protect herself from harm, they do not by themselves
lead to a logical conclusion that a person has a liberty interest in accessing
investigational drugs. The District of Columbia Circuit rejected Abigail
Alliance’s argument that self-defense principles permit a terminally ill
individual to assume “‘enormous risks’ in pursuit of potentially life-saving
drugs.”  Due to the emphasis on freedom from unwanted touching or bodily113
harm, the doctrines actually provide further support for a right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment, rather than a right to access such treatment.
The approach used by the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas114
provides a more expansive methodology to recognizing a liberty interest under
the Due Process Clause. In Lawrence, John Lawrence and Tyron Garner were
convicted of violating a Texas statute that prohibited “deviate sexual
intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”  Lawrence and Garner115
argued that the statute violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court overturned Bowers v.
Hardwick  when it held that the statute as applied to adult males violated the116
liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  In overturning Bowers, the Court focused on two elements of117
the Court’s decision: (1) the restrictive definition of the liberty interest, and
(2) the Court’s emphasis on ancient history.
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The Bowers Court described the liberty interest at issue as the right of
“homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”  The Lawrence Court rejected this118
articulation of the asserted liberty interest. The Court explained that the
sodomy statutes touch “upon the most private human conduct, sexual
behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to
control a personal relationship that . . . is within the liberty of persons to
choose without being punished as criminals.”  The Court looked beyond the119
statute to find the root of the liberty interest—the ability to structure a
personal relationship. The ability to engage in homosexual sodomy was
viewed as an outcome of the exercise of the liberty interest, not the liberty
interest itself. The liberty interest was the ability to structure and control a
personal relationship.  The outcome of this liberty interest may be a desire120
to engage in homosexual sodomy or some other action related to the personal
relationship. A state cannot prohibit homosexual sodomy because such a
prohibition would restrict the liberty interest of the individual to structure a
personal relationship.
The Court relied heavily on the language in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,  emphasizing the liberty to make decisions concerning marriage,121
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education.  Casey described characteristics common to these liberty122
interests:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.123
The decisions concerning marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, children rearing, and education are all outcomes or variations
of the fundamental right to structure and control a personal relationship. The
Court concluded that persons in homosexual relationships should have the
same freedom to make these decisions as persons in heterosexual
relationships.124
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The Lawrence Court also departed from the Bowers Court’s emphasis on
the “ancient [historical] roots” of proscriptions against homosexual sodomy.125
The Lawrence Court moved away from an exclusive focus on the history of
the prohibition or the acceptance of such activity, and instead included history
as one element in the examination of the alleged liberty interest.  The Court126
explained, “[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”  The Court focused on127
other factors, such as the trends in recent history as related to homosexual
conduct, the stigma imposed on individuals by criminal statutes, and trends in
recent jurisprudence recognizing an individual’s liberty to make certain
decisions related to intimate elements of that person’s life.  The Lawrence128
Court’s use of history as one factor in the substantive due process inquiry
significantly weakens the D.C. Circuit’s recognition of the right to access
investigational drugs. The D.C. Circuit used ancient common law principles
to support its conclusion that regulation of investigational drugs does not have
deep historical roots.  If the D.C. Circuit applied the Lawrence Court’s129
analysis, the recent history of regulation of investigational drugs would
significantly weaken the alleged ancient roots of the right to access.
The en banc majority in Abigail Alliance also relied on history, but
arrived at the conclusion that drug regulation is the norm and not the
exception.  In concluding that there is no tradition of protecting a right of130
access to drugs, the majority traced the regulation of drugs back to 15th
century England and the Colony of Virginia’s 1736 act relating to the
“dispensing of more drugs than was ‘necessary or useful’ because that practice
had become ‘dangerous and intolerable.’”  The difference between these two131
interpretations of the history of drug regulation lies in how one classifies the
regulatory efforts. For example, the majority in the panel decision looked
exclusively at the history of regulation of efficacy.  The en banc majority,132
however, broadened its analysis of history to include all drug regulation
efforts. This broadening of the scope of the historical examination revealed a
long history of drug regulation in both England and the United States. These
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two contradictory conclusions about the history of drug regulation reveal the
dangers of relying exclusively on the history of regulation or lack thereof in
examining an asserted liberty interest.
The liberty interest examined in Lawrence is distinguishable from the
interest in access to investigational drugs because the ability to access
investigational drugs is not supported by an underlying constitutionally
protected liberty interest. The liberty interest recognized in Lawrence  is133
based on the right to privacy in the marriage relationship announced in
Griswold v. Connecticut  and its progeny. These liberty interests include the134
right to access contraceptives,  the right to access abortion,  and the right135 136
of persons less than sixteen years of age to access contraception.  All of137
these interests are some variation of the right to structure and control a
personal relationship. An individual’s decision to undergo treatment with
investigational drugs would have fallen within the classification of “intimate
and personal” choices described in Casey. However, there is not a long line
of prior decisions leading to the conclusion that an individual has a right to
access investigational drugs.
The arguments in support of the right of an individual to access
investigational drugs are derived from a liberty interest that the Supreme
Court has yet to explicitly recognize,  and which may have little or no legal138
tradition to support it. In rejecting the asserted liberty interest to physician-
assisted suicide, the Supreme Court cited the reluctance of the Court to
“expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for
responsible decision making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-
ended.”  Furthermore, the Court limited the scope of the language in Casey139
when it explained that the fact “[t]hat many of the rights and liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not
warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and
personal decisions are so protected . . . .”140
Patient-advocates concede that the right must be limited to certain drugs
that have demonstrated some level of efficacy and have satisfied minimal
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safety concerns.  The District of Columbia Circuit described the liberty141
interest as the “right of a terminally ill patient with no remaining approved
treatment options to decide, in consultation with his or her own doctor,
whether to seek access to investigational medications that the [FDA] concedes
are safe and promising enough for substantial human testing.”  This142
formulation of the asserted liberty interest appears to be too narrow, and many
courts would be reluctant to recognize this narrow formulation of the
interest.  Employing the Lawrence analysis, the asserted interest to access143
investigational drugs would need to be broadened to a more general right to
access potentially life-saving medical treatment. The ability to access certain
investigational drugs would be an outcome of this more general liberty interest
in the preservation of life through access to medical treatment. The Court,
however, has never recognized or suggested that an individual’s access to
medical care is a protected liberty interest.  If an individual has a right to144
access investigational drugs, why should this right be limited to only those
drugs that have passed Phrase I testing? Furthermore, how would any changes
in the current regulatory system affect the constitutional right, when the
asserted liberty interest actually depends on a regulatory determination that
the investigational drug is safe for testing?  The right to access145
investigational drugs would only have substance if the individual could obtain
any investigational drug that a drug manufacturer was willing to provide.
Therefore, it is unlikely that a court would find a right to access
investigational drugs even when employing the more expansive analysis of
Lawrence.
A constitutionally protected liberty interest in the access to certain
investigational drugs would likely become illusory because of the
complications that would arise in the exercise of such a right. There is serious
doubt as to whether drug manufacturers would provide the investigational
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medicines to terminally ill individuals.  Furthermore, the failure of the146
investigational drug may halt further clinical trials and expose the drug
manufacturer to enormous liability.  Drug manufacturers already spend147
considerable amounts of money defending lawsuits arising from FDA-
approved drugs, and it is doubtful that manufacturers would want to add to
these costs by providing individuals with investigational drugs.148
Furthermore, if a terminally ill patient chooses an investigational drug and
suffers adverse health effects, who will be financially responsible for any
subsequent medical care to treat the adverse conditions? The creation of a
constitutional right to access investigational drugs would also remove the
question from the very institutions best equipped to address it—Congress and
the FDA.  Furthermore, the courts traditionally defer to the legislature in149
circumstances of scientific and medical uncertainty.  Constitutional150
protection places an issue beyond the reach of legislative and regulatory action
in most instances.  The many complications created by the exercise of the151
asserted liberty interest and the lack of support in recent constitutional
jurisprudence suggests that the best approach to increasing access to
investigational drugs for terminally ill patients is through changes in the
current legislative and regulatory scheme governing the distribution of
investigational drugs.
III. STATUTORY FOUNDATIONS FOR RIGHT TO ACCESS
INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS
Perhaps the strongest argument in support of a right to access
investigational drugs is that safety concerns in the FDCA do not apply to
terminally ill patients. When discussing whether it is possible for a person to
treat himself unjustly, Aristotle explained, “For he suffers voluntarily, but no
one is voluntarily treated unjustly. . . . It is not possible to treat oneself
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unjustly.”  The root of this idea is that “[n]o injustice has been done when152
an individual hurts him- or herself, if this person was beforehand fully aware
of . . . a consequence . . . and if this person has accepted voluntarily to take the
risk.”  Udo Schüklenk applied these arguments to the right of terminally ill153
patients to access investigational drugs to conclude:
When a person is faced with the inevitable outcome of disease progression, that is death,
and this person is given the chance to try an experimental therapy with unknown
outcome, then it is obvious that the worst possible outcome would again be the death of
this person. All other outcomes would improve the baseline situation of this patient.154
Schüklenk does acknowledge that there is a possibility that the
investigational therapy could hasten disease progression, but argues that this
risk is not much greater than that of individuals who enroll in clinical trials.155
Therefore, if the inevitable outcome for a terminally ill patient is death,
considerations of safety in the regulation of investigational drugs should not
apply. This argument has not received widespread acceptance.
The Supreme Court examined the application of the FDCA to terminally
ill patients in United States v. Rutherford.  A group of terminally ill cancer156
patients brought suit to enjoin the United States from prohibiting the interstate
shipment of Laetrile, an investigational drug thought to be useful in the
treatment of cancer.  Laetrile was not approved under the FDCA for157
distribution in interstate commerce.  The Court held that the FDCA is fully158
applicable to terminally ill patients and that the safety and efficacy standards
of the FDCA apply equally to terminally ill patients and patients suffering
from curable disease alike. In support of this, the Court relied on the fact that
the FDCA contains no exceptions for terminally ill patients, and there is no
evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended to create such an
exception.  The Court concluded that questions of safety are inseparable159
from considerations of efficacy.  In support of its conclusion that the160
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FDCA’s safety standards apply equally to terminally ill patients, the Court
argued that “a drug is unsafe if it’s potential for inflicting death or physical
injury is not offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit.”  Furthermore,161
“[a]n otherwise harmless drug can be dangerous to any patient if it does not
produce its purported therapeutic effect. But if an individual suffering from
a potentially fatal disease rejects conventional therapy in favor of a drug with
no demonstrable curative properties, the consequences can be irreversible.”162
The Court does not adequately address the arguments made by Schüklenk.
Proponents of a right to access investigational drugs seek access for patients
who have exhausted all conventional treatments.  The Court based its163
conclusion on the premise that an individual may suffer severe consequences
if he or she forgoes conventional treatment in favor of an investigational
treatment.  Therefore, the Court’s conclusion is less persuasive when a164
patient has exhausted all forms of conventional treatment. Schüklenk’s
argument—that any outcome other than death is an improved baseline
situation of the patient—should apply in such a situation. A clinical trial for
the same investigational drug would expose a terminally ill patient to some,
if not all, of the same risks.  The structure of the current clinical trial system165
does not appear to significantly increase safety for terminally ill patients who
have exhausted all conventional forms of treatment. If the terminally ill patient
exhausts all conventional forms of treatment and participation in a clinical
trial would expose the individual to the same risks as presented by personal
use, the importance of safety for this individual is greatly reduced. The FDCA
fails to adequately address this type of situation.
An alternative approach to directly attacking the FDCA is increased
access through changes to the regulations promulgated under the FDCA. In
response to the recent pressure to increase access to investigational drugs, the
FDA has adopted this approach and, in December of 2006, issued proposed
regulations to increase access.  The proposed regulations seek to clarify how166
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patients can receive access to investigational drugs during clinical trials
without meeting the exact criteria of the trial.  The proposals focus on167
expanded access for individual patients, intermediate-size patient populations,
and larger populations under Treatment IND.  The proposals, however, do168
not create any new expanded-access programs and would permit companies
to charge for the costs of manufacturing the drug. Such prices would be
limited to costs of manufacturing to prevent companies from earning a profit
under the new program.  The FDA’s goal in permitting drug manufacturers169
to recover costs is to encourage smaller manufacturers to participate in
expanded-access programs. The current prohibition on charging patients for
the investigational drug prevents many smaller manufacturers from
participating in these programs because they cannot afford to manufacture the
drug.  The FDA explained that the changes are “intended to improve access170
to investigational drugs for patients with serious or immediately life-
threatening diseases or conditions, who lack other therapeutic options.”171
Critics of the proposed regulations argue that the rules do not make any
significant changes and will result in a de minimis increase in access for
terminally ill patients.172
The FDA opposes providing blanket access to investigational drugs for
fear that such access will trump safety concerns. FDA policies have
traditionally focused on the scientific validation of potential therapies.173
Therefore, current regulations restrict access until the manufacturer can
provide proof of efficacy.  Furthermore, providing access to the174
investigational drug prior to approval would undermine the clinical trial
system by reducing the number of patients willing to participate.  Few175
patients would volunteer for a clinical trial where they stand a chance of
receiving a placebo. The FDA seeks to maintain a balance between access and
safety despite this emphasis on scientific validation. The FDA has stated that
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two of its most important regulatory goals are: (1) to protect the public from
harm through product regulatory mechanisms, and (2) to maximize individual
autonomy.  These goals operate in a closed system. Therefore, it is almost176
impossible to increase focus on both goals simultaneously. Any increase in
individual autonomy will decrease the emphasis on safety and vice versa.177
The unique situation of a terminally ill patient destroys the balance
between the concerns of safety and individual autonomy because an individual
who has exhausted all conventional treatments has no concern for safety. This
places the FDA in a difficult position when trying to justify safety concerns
because a terminally ill patient is likely to die while awaiting approval for an
investigational drug. Safety measures as applied to that individual appear
useless at best and harmful at worst. Although the FDA remains committed to
safety in these situations, it has also recognized the need to provide access to
certain terminally ill patients who have exhausted all other options.  The178
FDA continues to focus on increasing access by working to reduce review
times.  This method of increasing access maintains the current review179
process but seeks to reduce review times by refining the process.180
The FDA’s response to the situation of terminally ill patients is
inadequate. Scores of people will die while the FDA spends years determining
how to reduce review times. Applying the normal safety concerns to
terminally ill patients does not seem sensible. Some safety regulations are
necessary to protect terminally ill patients from taking risks that expose them
to significant dangers with no potential benefit,  but the current balance181
between safety and individual autonomy gives too much weight to safety
concerns to the detriment of terminally ill patients.
The most common arguments against increased access include the
following: (1) the more access is increased, the harder it is to collect data on
safety and efficacy; (2) access undermines the current clinical trial system
because patients will seek direct treatment rather than enter a trial; and
(3) access increases potential for fraud because drug companies would be
permitted to market unproven drugs.  Therefore, opponents of access argue182
that increased access will have an overall detrimental effect on the
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development of new life-saving drugs. The alternative to access is maintaining
the current structure of clinical trials while increasing the use of trials until
clinical research becomes a standard method of treating cancer.  This183
alternative would maintain the current accelerated approval process and
compassionate-use program to provide access to investigational drugs in
certain extreme situations where clinical trials are unable to provide care for
the patient.184
An alternative solution to the problem of access is to eliminate the current
clinical trial system. Opponents of the current system argue that it is unethical
because it knowingly denies the investigational treatment to some patients and
gives other patients a placebo, thus providing no active treatment at all.185
Therefore, even if a terminally ill patient qualifies for a clinical trial, there is
no guarantee that the patient will receive the investigational drug. The fact that
placebo trials are used on terminally ill patients makes the system particularly
troublesome. A cancer patient who receives a placebo is likely to die despite
her belief or hope that she is receiving the investigational drug.  Opponents186
of the system argue that the FDA should abandon placebo trials for terminally
ill diseases because there is a significant difference between conducting such
trials on the terminally ill and on generally healthy people.  Some opponents187
propose replacing placebo trials with large, open access trials that permit
access for any individual who wants the new drug.  These trials would188
replace the placebo with statistical methods known as Bayesian statistics,
which allow for statistically valid and reliable analysis without using
randomized clinical trials.  The FDA already uses these statistical models to189
analyze results for medical device trials.190
The only difference between clinical trial use and individual use of an
investigational drug appears to be the benefits derived from each use. The
clinical trial system can result in an outcome that is beneficial for a greater
number of people by approving the distribution of an investigational drug that
has demonstrated both its safety and efficacy. The clinical trial system,
however, still exposes the patient to significant risks, and the requirements and
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specifications of the trial severely restrict patient access to the investigational
drug during the trial period.  The stringent requirements result in a191
participation rate of two to five percent for potential patients.  Individual use192
of an investigational drug promotes self-determination and may sustain and
prolong the life an individual. Such use, however, may damage potential long-
term benefits for the entire population of individuals suffering from that
particular disease by reducing the amount of data on the safety and efficacy
of the investigational drug.  We must continue to review and carefully193
monitor the current drug approval system and access mechanisms to determine
which of the two approaches, or which combination thereof, will create the
best equitable balance between access and safety.
IV. CONCLUSION
The right of a terminally ill patient to access certain investigational drugs
has little support in either the Constitution or the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence related to the alleged liberty interest in access. Courts have
traditionally deferred to legislatures to make decisions concerning access and
the availability of medical treatment.  Furthermore, any right to access194
investigational drugs is likely to become illusory unless drug manufacturers
are mandated to provide the individual with the drug. Determining the
appropriate scope of access to investigational drugs requires a delicate
balancing of individual autonomy against the interest of the public in ensuring
the safety of drugs. Elevating the access to investigational drugs to the level
of a constitutional right would severely restrict the ability of Congress and the
FDA to arrive at a proper balance between access and safety. Furthermore,
constitutional protection of the right to access places the individual’s interest
above the larger community of persons suffering from the particular disease
and those who will contract the disease in the future. Congress and the FDA
must work to reduce review times and to provide simple and viable access
programs for terminally ill patients with no remaining treatment options so
that a person placed in the situation Kianna Karnes faced before her death has
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the ability to tell her children that she did everything possible to prolong her
life. No drug regulatory system will ever be perfect, since no system can
simultaneously grant access to every person who wants access to an
investigational drug and protect society from the potential harmful effects of
investigational drugs. Congress and the FDA must, however, strive to develop
a regulatory framework that limits potential harm posed by investigational
drugs while maintaining a fair system to provide access to individuals with no
hope of recovery through conventional treatment.
